Local Stability of Cooperation in a Continuous Model of Indirect Reciprocity

Explore a 27-minute lecture on the local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity, presented by Seung Ki Baek from the PCS Institute for Basic Science. Delve into the power of reputation as a mechanism for enforcing cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, while examining the challenges posed by disagreement stemming from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. Investigate the stability of cooperation in the donation game by considering players' reputations and behaviors as continuous variables. Analyze the stability in the presence of erroneous assessment by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation. Discover the differences between Image Scoring and Simple Standing, particularly in how punishment for defection against well-reputed players is viewed. Learn about the derived condition that social norms should meet to penalize close variants, supported by numerical simulation. Examine the crucial factors in this condition, including the appreciation of well-reputed players' donations to ill-reputed co-players and its relation to the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation. Gain insights into how indirect reciprocity can function beyond the simple dichotomy of good and bad, even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.

Seung Ki Baek: Local Stability of Cooperation in a Continuous Model of Indirect Reciprocity