Simulation and Indexical Function Individuation - Why the Diagonal Argument Does Not Establish the Impossibility of Machine Consciousness

Explore a critical analysis of diagonal arguments against algorithmic accounts of consciousness in this 27-minute conference talk from the Models of Consciousness Conferences. Delve into Ron Chrisley's examination of Penrose's formulation, which uses the "Turing Machine Non-Halting Question" to argue against the possibility of machine consciousness and digital simulation of conscious human behavior. Discover how Chrisley challenges these negative conclusions by demonstrating that perfect simulation can occur even when systems compute different function classes, and that consciousness can exist in a system unable to simulate all conscious agents. Learn about the characterization of Turing computational systems within a broader class of question-answering systems, the existence of questions isomorphic to the Turing Non-Halting Question, and the distinction between extensional and indexical intentional function computation. Gain insights into how these findings create mathematical possibilities for algorithmically generated conscious behavior.

Ron Chrisley - Simulation and indexical function individuation