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Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent - Beyond the Common Prior

Offered By: IEEE via YouTube

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IEEE FOCS: Foundations of Computer Science Courses Algorithms Courses Algorithmic Game Theory Courses

Course Description

Overview

Explore the intricacies of mechanism design for no-regret agents in this 24-minute IEEE conference talk. Delve into running examples, challenge the common prior assumption, and examine a comprehensive framework for mechanism design. Gain insights into key principles, analyze results, and understand the proposed algorithm as speakers Modibo K Camara, Jason Hartline, and Aleck Johnsen from Northwestern University present their findings. Conclude with a deeper understanding of advanced concepts in mechanism design that go beyond traditional approaches.

Syllabus

Introduction
Running Examples
Common Prior Assumption
Framework for Mechanism Design
Principles of Mechanism Design
Running Example
Results
Algorithm
Conclusion


Taught by

IEEE FOCS: Foundations of Computer Science

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