Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86 - Session 3

Explore the groundbreaking Hertzbleed attack in this conference talk, which transforms power side-channel attacks into remote timing attacks on x86 processors. Delve into the intricacies of Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) on modern Intel CPUs and understand how frequency depends on power consumption. Examine data-dependent frequency variations and their implications for security. Investigate the frequency leakage model and its application to bit positions. Learn about the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) protocol and how it's vulnerable to adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Analyze the remote timing attack model, discuss its implications, and explore potential mitigations for this novel security threat.

Intro
Power Side Channel vs Remote Timing
DVFS on a modern Intel CPU
Frequency Depends on Power
Example of Data-Dependent Frequency
Frequency Leakage Model
Case Study: Bit Positions
More experiments in the paper!
Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation
An Important Step of SIKE's Decapsulation
Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack Idea
Target Implementation
Remote Timing Attack Model
Discussion & Takeaway
Mitigations