Strict Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences

Explore a lecture on hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences in this 29-minute talk by Bettina Klaus from the University of Lausanne. Delve into the concept of friend-oriented preferences, where agents categorize others as "friends" or "enemies," impacting their coalition preferences. Discover how these preferences create a friendship graph and learn about the partition associated with strongly connected components (SCC) of this graph. Examine the proof that the SCC partition belongs to the strict core and understand why the SCC mechanism, which assigns this partition, is group strategy-proof. Investigate the main finding that on rich subdomains of friend-oriented preferences, the SCC mechanism uniquely satisfies both core stability and strategy-proofness. Gain insights into online and matching-based market design through this analysis of hedonic games and their strategic implications.

Strict Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences