What Do We Agree on When We Disagree? Forward Contracts with Private Forecasts - Rothschild Lecture
Offered By: Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences via YouTube
Course Description
Overview
Explore a lecture on forward contracts and risk management in spot markets, focusing on how firms with differing price forecasts and risk aversion negotiate agreements. Examine various approaches to bilateral forward contract negotiations, including direct Nash bargaining solutions and broker-mediated deals. Investigate a unique equilibrium model where firms offer supply functions to determine clearing prices and quantities for forward contracts. Discover how firms can potentially leverage competitors' offers to enhance their own market predictions. Gain insights into the complexities of financial decision-making when market participants have divergent views on future price distributions.
Syllabus
Date: Monday 29th April 2019 - 16:00 to
Taught by
Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences
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