One TPM to Bind Them All - Fixing TPM2.0 for Provably Secure Anonymous Attestation

Explore a conference talk that addresses critical security issues in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 specification for direct anonymous attestation. Delve into the shortcomings of the current interfaces, including their lack of security proofs and vulnerability to Diffie-Hellman oracle attacks. Examine proposed fixes and their limitations, such as enabling fraudulent TPMs to compromise anonymity. Discover a new specification for TPM 2.0 interfaces that resolves these problems with minimal changes to existing commands. Learn how these revised interfaces can be used to construct secure anonymous attestation schemes based on g-SDH and LRSW. Gain insights into potential applications for key-binding in U-Prove and e-cash systems.

One TPM to Bind Them All: Fixing TPM2.0 for Provably Secure Anonymous Attestation