On the Non-Uniqueness of Linear Markov Perfect Equilibria in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games - A Geometric Approach

Explore a seminar on dynamic games and applications focusing on the non-uniqueness of Linear Markov Perfect Equilibria (LMPEs) in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games. Delve into the scarcity of literature on models with multiple LMPEs and examine the prevalence of unique LMPEs in single-state economic problems. Analyze the phase plane in the state and derivative of the value function to derive conditions for multiplicity. Investigate additional examples using different pathways from known ones, and discover how these examples contradict common economic model assumptions. Examine an extended state space scenario in learning-by-doing that leads to multiple LMPEs. Gain insights from Franz Wirl of the University of Vienna in this 50-minute presentation at the GERAD Research Center.

On the Non-Uniqueness of Linear Markov Perfect Equilibria in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games