Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries - Practical Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS

Explore a comprehensive analysis of nonce-reuse vulnerabilities in the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) algorithm within TLS encryption. Delve into the research conducted by security experts, uncovering over 70,000 HTTPS servers at risk of nonce reuse and 184 servers repeating nonces in short connections. Examine the implications for large corporations, financial institutions, and even a credit card company. Learn about the proof-of-concept attack that compromises HTTPS connection authenticity and enables content injection. Gain insights into TLS encryption, symmetric encryption, and various attacks like Lucky 13 and RC4. Understand GCM authentication, nonce reuse consequences, and the technical details of exploiting these vulnerabilities. Discover the researchers' methodology for Internet-wide scanning, tracking devices, and implementing the attack. Explore future trends, potential solutions, and the importance of addressing GCM weaknesses in hardware implementations.

Introduction
Getting Started
TLS Encryption
symmetric encryption
lucky 13 attack
RC4 attack
GCM
Other cryptographers
Adam Langley
TLS specification
Scanning the Internet
Tracking Devices
Radware
Devices
Sign For
OpenSSL 101
Attack Description
GCM Background
GCM Authentication
Highlevel attackers
Lowlevel attackers
Nonce reuse
Fully known polynomial
Application in TLS
GCM stream cipher
Changing the HTML response
Attacking the same domain
Future trends
Conclusion
GitHub
Session Key
Problems with GCM
Weak keys in GCM
What can we bring to hardware vendors