Learning and Persuading with Anecdotes - IPAM at UCLA

Explore a 28-minute conference talk on learning and persuasion through anecdotal evidence, presented by Nika Haghtalab at IPAM's Mathematics of Collective Intelligence Workshop. Delve into a model of communication between two agents using hard anecdotal evidence, examining rational behaviors in equilibrium and the temptation for senders to provide biased information. Gain insights into human communication, polarization, and biased beliefs. Investigate topics such as generalization vs. communication, strategic behavior in journalism, equilibrium characterization, and the implications for receivers. Discover how homophily can arise from rational strategic behavior and explore the connections between strategic communication in economics and machine learning.

Intro
Communication and Opinion Formation
Generalization VS Communication
Learning and Persuading with Anecdotes
Journalism Example
Impact of Strategic Communication
Model - Observations
Model - Sender
Model - Receiver
Model - Rational Behavior
Communication Schemes
Understanding Sender's Choices
Temptation to Persuade
Equilibrium Characterization
Bias and Extreme Signals in Equilibria
Implications on the Receiver
Homophily due to Rational Strategic Behavior
Equilibria and Reputation
Strategic Communication in Economics
Machine Learning and Strategic Behavior