Maximum Matching with Consecutive Acceptance Intervals

Explore a 55-minute DS4DM Coffee Talk on maximum matching with consecutive acceptance intervals presented by Szilvia Papai from Concordia University, Canada. Delve into a one-to-one matching market where agents are matched to objects from their acceptable set, which is consecutive relative to a fixed objective ranking. Examine the commonly known profile of consecutive acceptance intervals and the private strict individual preference rankings. Learn about a simple algorithm for finding maximum matchings and their characterization for arbitrary acceptance intervals. Investigate serial dictatorships, including scenarios where they may not yield maximum matchings, and discover the characterization of interval profiles where maximum serial dictatorships exist. Understand the Pareto-optimal and group-strategyproof properties of these rules in terms of agent permutations producing maximum matchings.

Maximum Matching with Consecutive Acceptance Intervals, Szilvia Papai