Economically Exhaustible Resources in an Oligopoly-Fringe Model with Renewables

Explore a dynamic game theory model examining the interplay between oligopolistic and fringe suppliers of fossil fuels and renewable energy producers. Delve into the characterization of an open-loop equilibrium, analyzing the effects of stock-dependent and convex extraction costs on resource exhaustion and market dynamics. Investigate the emergence of a non-traditional limit-pricing phase where both fossil and renewable suppliers coexist. Examine the welfare loss decomposition due to imperfect competition, quantifying conservation and sequence effects. Gain insights into the non-monotonic relationship between initial carbon emissions and renewable energy subsidies. Learn from Hassan Benchekroun's presentation at the Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar, offering a comprehensive analysis of economically exhaustible resources in an oligopoly-fringe model with renewables.

Economically Exhaustible Resources in an Oligopoly-Fringe Model with Renewables, Hassan Benchekroun