Breaking and Partially Fixing Provably Secure Onion Routing
Offered By: IEEE via YouTube
Course Description
Overview
Explore a critical analysis of provably secure onion routing protocols in this IEEE conference talk. Delve into the discovery of vulnerabilities in HORNET and Sphinx systems that compromise anonymity, despite their supposed security proofs. Examine the flaws in the original proof strategy and learn about improved properties suggested to enhance the security of onion routing protocols. Gain insights into the process of analyzing and fixing proof strategies, understanding the importance of effective properties in ensuring privacy. Discover common mistakes in proofs and how to avoid them, ultimately contributing to the partial fixing of the family of provably secure onion routing protocols.
Syllabus
Intro
Onion Routing/Mixing
HORNET X
Garbage attack
Proof Strategy
What went wrong?
We want
New Onion Routing Property
Layer Unlinkability
Tail Indistinguishability
More Details...
Summary
Taught by
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tags
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