Asymptotic Behavior and Selection of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Stackelberg Games
Offered By: GERAD Research Center via YouTube
Course Description
Overview
Explore the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) and SPNE outcomes in one-leader one-follower Stackelberg games during this 53-minute seminar on dynamic games and applications. Delve into the effects of perturbations on both action sets and payoff functions, and discover how this analysis leads to defining selection methods for SPNEs that accommodate various player behaviors. Examine specific selection results associated with perturbations based on Tikhonov regularization, adverse-to-move behavior, and altruistic behavior. Gain insights from the research conducted by Maria Carmela Ceparano from the Università Degli Studi Di Napoli Federico II, in collaboration with Francesco Caruso and Jacqueline Morgan, as presented at the GERAD Research Center.
Syllabus
Asymptotic Behavior and Selection of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Stackelberg Games
Taught by
GERAD Research Center
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