A Simple Protocol for Remote Attestation of System Integrity

Explore a simple protocol for remote attestation of system integrity in this 29-minute Linux Foundation conference talk. Learn how to overcome the limitations of TPM key sealing with the proposed IMA Digest Lists extension, enabling the inclusion of Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) measurements in platform state. Discover a streamlined solution for remote attestation that eliminates the need for dedicated servers by leveraging TLS channel endpoints and the TCG's Subject Key Attestation Evidence (SKAE) X.509 extension. Delve into the feasibility issues of conventional solutions, understand the tradeoffs made, and gain insights into protecting mutable files, reducing TCB size, and implementing chained integrity verification across reboots. Examine the Infoflow LSM implementation process and explore the source code to enhance your understanding of this innovative approach to system integrity attestation.

Intro
Remote Attestation - Problem
Background - Explicit RA
Simple RA Protocol with Implicit RA
Mutable Files in the IMA Measurement List
Alternative Solution for Evaluation of Mutable Fles
Unknown Impact of Process Actions without MAC
Protect Mutable Files with Mandatory Access Control
Integrity Models - Biba vs Clark-Wison
PRIMA Overview and Drawbacks
Our Proposal to Simplify and Complete PRIMA
Reduce TCB size
Detect Malicious Updates of Mutable Fles
Exclude Mutable Files from Measurement
Chained Integrity Verification across Reboots
Implicit RA-Verification Options
Infollow LSM Implementation - Setup Phase
Infoflow LSM Implementation - Deployment Phase
Source Code
Conclusions