Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats in Game Theory - Lecture 15

Explore game theory concepts in this Yale University lecture focusing on backward induction, chess strategies, and credible threats. Learn about Zermelo's theorem and its proof by induction, which demonstrates that games like tic-tac-toe and chess have definitive solutions. Delve into the formal definitions of perfect information and strategies in sequential games, and discover how to find Nash equilibria. Examine the inconsistencies between some Nash equilibria and backward induction, particularly in scenarios involving seemingly non-credible threats. The lecture covers first and second mover advantages, games of induction, and economic examples of games with perfect information, providing a comprehensive overview of these advanced game theory topics.

- Chapter 1. First and Second Mover Advantages: Zermelo's Theorem.
- Chapter 2. Zermelo's Theorem: Proof.
- Chapter 3. Zermelo's Theorem: Generalization.
- Chapter 4. Zermelo's Theorem: Games of Induction.
- Chapter 5. Games of Perfect Information: Definition.
- Chapter 6. Games of Perfect Information: Economic Example.